R esearch studies and media headlines alike document the large test score gaps between students who are Black or Hispanic and those who are White or Asian (Jencks & Phillips, 1998) . For example, recent results from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) showed that nationwide, 87% of White students but only 54% of Black students performed at or above the "basic" level on the 2003 eighth grade reading exam. Similar disparities exist across all grade levels between White and Asian students on one hand and Black and Hispanic students on the other (National Center for Education Statistics, 2003a Statistics, , 2003b .
The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), signed by President Bush on January 8, 2002, has the declared intentions of helping "all students meet high academic standards" by 2014 and, more specifically, of increasing the academic performance of subgroups of students with traditionally low levels of achievement.
1 A key requirement of the legislation is that states administer annual tests in reading and math in Grades 3 through 8 and one high school grade and make available school-level performance data disaggregated by race and ethnicity, poverty, gender, special education, and English proficiency status. Furthermore, states must use sanctions to hold schools and districts accountable for their success in meeting adequate yearly progress (AYP) goals, set by the states, for both overall performance and performance in each subgroup. 2 Notice, however, that the subgroup-reporting component of the law, which has received particular emphasis in the popular press as a means of reducing racial disparities, may not, in practice, provide the hoped-for results. 3 The most important reason is that the largest test disparities in performance between race groups are between schools that are racially segregated rather than within schools that are racially integrated. And NCLB subgroup reporting brings no additional pressure to bear to address the significant gap in performance between racially segregated schools.
In addition, the increased attention to the performance of minority students that emerges from the subgroup accountability will be unevenly distributed across schools, falling disproportionately on urban schools and substantially bypassing rural and suburban schools, which are more likely to be racially homogeneous. 4 Finally, the implementation of minimum subgroup sizes for subgroup reporting (to ensure statistically appropriate subgroup performance scores) will create an incentive for schools, and perhaps districts, to manipulate the compositions of their student bodies to avoid the requirement to report performance in some subgroups. The implication is that the desire to avoid any additional pressure of NCLB subgroup accountability, beyond the pressure created by the overall AYP standards, may mean that school segregation may be exacerbated and the race gap worsened. 5 We used data on elementary and middle schools in New York State to illustrate these phenomena, focusing on subgroups of White and non-White students. To preview the results, we found that school segregation in New York State significantly limits the impact that subgroup reporting can possibly have on lowering the racial test score gap. Put simply, a surprisingly small share of all New York State schools will be held accountable for disparities in performance between Whites and non-Whites. Moreover, the gap in performance between Whites and non-Whites in racially segregated schools is considerably larger than within integrated schools. The new subgroup reporting provisions of NCLB will apply where the gap is less severe. Finally, New York State schools that will be held accountable for racial subgroups are distinguished from ones that will not by their larger sizes and their concentration in urban areas.
We consider whether raising accountability for subgroup performance to the district level mitigates the effects of segregation on NCLB subgroup accountability measures. Unfortunately, segregation across districts is also quite profound, and district accountability for the race gap is found to result in far less than the full coverage of schools. Our results raise important questions about whether the federal NCLB subgroup accountability will act in such a way as to effect higher test scores and reduce disparities in performance between race groups, or whether school segregation in the United States will render school and district subgroup accountability measures ineffective.
Review of Related Literature The Race Gap in Test Scores
There is considerable evidence of the persistence of gaps in performance between White and non-White students (and specifically between White and Hispanic and between White and Black students) using both state and national data on standardized test scores from early childhood to high school. Jencks and Philips's (1998) volume The Black-White Test Score Gap presents evidence and several studies that examined the scope and causes of the disparity. Hedges and Nowell (1998) , for example, used high school test score data from six nationally representative surveys conducted between 1965 and 1992 to find that the test score gaps between Whites and Blacks declined over this period, that adjusting for socioeconomic factors reduced gaps by less than half, and that the trends in adjusted and unadjusted test score gaps followed similar paths. More recently, Fryer and Levitt (2004) found that adjusting for the background characteristics of students reduced the Black-White achievement gap to zero at kindergarten entry (but not thereafter), on the basis of the cohort of kindergarteners through first graders from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study.
Several studies have made efforts to identify the extent to which disparities in test scores reflect differences within schools rather than between schools. Cook and Evans (2000) , for example, decomposed reductions in the White-Black NAEP test score gap among middle school students between 1970 and 1988. They found that 25% of the change could be attributed to family and school characteristics, whereas 75% could be attributed to within-school reductions. Reardon (2003) , using the same Early Childhood Longitudinal Study data set as Fryer and Levitt (2004) , found that during kindergarten, test score gaps grow within schools, even after controlling for socioeconomic status and school context, and in first grade, between-school rather than within-school components explain growth in gaps. Stiefel, Schwartz, and Ellen (2004) decomposed New York City fifth and eighth grade reading test score gaps (White-Black, White-Hispanic, and WhiteAsian in school years 1995-1996 and 2000-2001) into differences attributable to students' socioeducational traits, within-school factors, and betweenschool factors. They found that for both Black and Hispanic students, the between-school effects accounted for approximately one third of the total difference in scores.
Segregation
School segregation has a long history in the United States, linked in part to residential segregation. Massey and Denton (1993) provided a comprehensive examination of residential segregation during the past century, describing how racial divisions between residential communities were maintained even during an era of great population shifts, with Black population movement to northern cities and White migration to suburbs across the nation. They illustrated that residential segregation became a permanent feature of U.S. cities after World War II and into the 1980s: The dissimilarity index remained in the high 80s from 1940 to 1970 in the 30 metropolitan areas with the largest Black populations, and the isolation index did not dip below 50 in any city from 1970 to 1980.
6 More recently, Orfield and Lee (2004) examined school segregation, exploring student segregation across schools within the nation and within and between states. They found a trend toward resegregation between 1991 and 2001 in states that had been highly desegregated in 1991. Interestingly, in 2001, New York was one of the most segregated states for Black and Hispanic students according to two different measures: exposure to White students and percentage minority in majority White schools. Furthermore, Clotfelter (2001) found that school racial segregation is increasing, although withindistrict segregation is declining, leaving most segregation attributable to between-district sorting.
Accountability and Testing
Despite the absence of consensus on the causes of test score gaps or the best methods to reduce those disparities, NCLB codified the belief that school and district accountability would reduce achievement gaps within each state and across the nation.
The notion that accountability measures can reduce test score gaps (or improve students' performance) has considerable appeal and some supporting evidence (Hanushek, 2002; Loeb & Strunk, 2003) .
7 Ladd (1999) suggested that the accountability system implemented by the Dallas Independent School District led to improvement in performance for Hispanic but not Black students on state tests relative to students in other large Texas cities. In contrast, Smith and Mickelson (2000) found that an accountability program in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, did not increase students' performance relative to the state average. Carnoy and Loeb (2003) used NAEP scores and a ranking of states' accountability systems to assess the effects of systems that vary across, not within, states. They found that states with stronger accountability systems had greater gains in fourth and eighth grade scores for Hispanic and Black students and across-the-board eighth grade gains for students of all races. Fuller and Johnson (2001) found similar results using data from Texas on state standardized exams. Finally, Hanushek and Raymond (2005) , using NAEP scores, concluded that accountability systems improve student performance overall while narrowing Hispanic-White but not Black-White achievement gaps.
In a different vein, have explored some of the difficulties anticipated in the implementation of accountability measures, most recently in Peterson and West's (2003) No Child Left Behind? 8 They found that accountability schemes requiring schools to ensure test score gains by students from all racial and ethnic backgrounds tend to penalize integrated schools by making year-to-year measures of achievement changes more volatile. These subgroup accountability provisions fall more heavily on integrated schools even when, on average, over several years, their students are performing better than students in segregated schools. Stiefel, Schwartz, and Chellman (2003) pursued a somewhat different direction, analyzing the potential effects of subgroup size exemptions on the extent to which accountability for both White and non-White student performance will bind on schools in New York State. Here, we build on this research and their suggestion that segregation will limit the effectiveness of the subgroup accountability parts of reforms in reducing test score gaps because of the presence of racially homogeneous schools.
Data
We used school-and district-level data obtained from the New York State Education Department (NYSED) for 2001-2002. 9 These data included school-level scores for tests in English language arts (ELA) and math and school characteristics, such as enrollment and percentage of students eligible for free and reduced-price lunch. We combined these data with districtlevel variables obtained from the NYSED, including expenditures per pupil, racial breakdown at the district level, and percentage of students in the district eligible for free and reduced-price lunch.
A small number of schools were eliminated from the analyses because they educate large proportions of special education students. Specifically, these schools have more than 40% of students with individualized education programs, and most (75%) are located in New York City's District 75, a program-specific (rather than geographically determined) district serving mostly full-time special education students.
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Schools educating fourth graders are largely elementary schools, schools educating eighth graders are largely middle schools, and they are referred to as elementary and middle schools, respectively, below. Note, however, that some schools serving eighth grade students also contain high school grades, and some schools (211) serve both fourth and eighth graders. These latter schools appear in both the elementary and middle school analyses. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for elementary and middle schools in 2001-2002. There were 2,249 elementary schools and 1,068 middle schools in New York State with 10 or more students tested in ELA and math in school year [2001] [2002] . This cutoff and the exclusion of schools with high proportions of special education students increased the reliability of the subsequent school gap analyses, although results using all schools were qualitatively the same.
The smallest elementary schools in the state tested, by construction, 10 students in fourth grade, whereas the largest tested 370, with a statewide average of 93 students tested in fourth grade. The average middle school tested 188 students in eighth grade, whereas the largest tested 969 (the minimum, again by definition, was 10). These differences in grade sizes also were reflected in total school enrollment: The state average elementary school enrollment was 577 (ranging from 58 to 2,164), whereas the average middle school enrolled 741 students (ranging from 102 to 2,532).
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In [2001] [2002] , approximately 12% of students attending school in New York State were in special education programs, about 5% were Englishlanguage learners, and approximately 44% were poor. The NYSED divides the state's districts into geographic groups for reporting purposes. Using Table 1 Descriptive Note: The sample included all students from schools with 10 or more students tested in English language arts (ELA) and math and excluded schools in which more than 40% of the students had individualized education programs (or special education). Descriptive statistics are not student weighted. pass rates were above the state average on both exams and grades, whereas Black, Hispanic, and American Indian scores were below the average. White students outperformed non-White students (including Asians) by 27.7 percentage points on the fourth grade ELA exam and by 29.1 points on the fourth grade math exam. Variation by specific racial subgroup was large: Asian students did as well as White students on the ELA exam while outperforming White students on the math exam; Black students were the lowest performing, with a 42.4% pass rate on ELA and 45.8% pass rate on math.
The results for eighth grade were similar to those for fourth grade: White students outperformed non-White students by 30.7 points on the ELA exam and 34.8 points on the math exam. Again, variation by specific racial subgroup was large: Asians outperformed White students on both ELA and math, whereas Black students continued to perform the worst, with an average pass rate of 21.5% on the eighth grade ELA exam and 21% pass rate on the math exam.
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Which Schools Are Held Accountable for Test Score Gaps by Race? The sample included all students from schools with 10 or more students tested in ELA and math and excluded schools in which more than 40% of the students had individualized education programs.
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that schools with small numbers of students in subgroups would not be held accountable for those subgroups' performance. No specific threshold number of students was specified, however. 14 We set a threshold requiring 10 or more test scores in a subgroup (White or non-White) because current plans show New York State using a threshold of 30 students over three grades, or an average of 10 per grade.
15 Table 3 shows the distribution of schools and students tested by racial accountability "status": whether a school will be held accountable for the performance of both White and nonWhite students. For elementary schools, 42.4% (representing 34.6% of fourth grade students) would be held accountable for White students only, whereas 23.3% of schools (representing 26.5% of fourth graders) would be accountable for non-White students only. That leaves 34.4% of schools (with 39% of students) that would be held accountable for both White and non-White scores and that could report subgroup scores. Stiefel et al. / So Many Children Left Behind 537 The sample included all students from schools with 10 or more students tested in English language arts and math and excluded schools in which more than 40% of the students had individualized education programs. White-accountable schools had test performance data for 10 or more white students tested and fewer than 10 non-White students tested. Non-Whiteaccountable schools had test performance data for fewer than 10 White students tested and 10 or more non-White students tested. The number of students is based on the availability of performance data for English language arts. Numbers would be slightly different if based on data for math.
distribution.
Similar trends were found for middle schools, among which 36.7% (representing 20.9% of eighth grade students) would be held accountable for White students only, whereas 18.1% (educating 17.7% of non-White students) would be held accountable for non-White students only. The remaining 45.2% of schools (educating 61.4% of eighth grade students) would be held accountable for both White and non-White students. Again, schools accountable for both groups are larger.
Fewer than half of the schools in the state would be accountable for the performance of both White and non-White students; this pattern reflects the legacy of residential segregation in New York State (Orfield & Lee, 2004) . We found considerable segregation across the schools in the state. Statewide, in elementary schools, the dissimilarity index was 0.76 for school year [2001] [2002] , indicating that 76% of non-White students would have to transfer from schools in which they are overrepresented to schools in which they are underrepresented to achieve a distribution in each school proportional to their statewide percentage representation. 16 In middle schools, the dissimilarity index was 0.74 in 2001-2002. For schools accountable for both White and non-White students, the index fell to 0.49 in elementary schools and 0.59 in middle schools. Although these values were smaller than for elementary and middle schools as a whole, even those schools that were accountable for both groups were still highly segregated.
What Are the Correlates of School Subgroup
Accountability Status? Table 4 shows the ELA and math exam results for elementary schools by the accountability status of schools. The first and second columns include those schools that were accountable only for White students or only for non-White students, respectively. The third column combines schools from the first two columns into an aggregated single-group (White-only plus non-White-only) accountability column, and the fourth column includes schools that were accountable for both White and non-White students.
ELA pass rates for White-only accountable and non-White only accountable schools were lower across all groups compared with pass rates in schools that were accountable for both groups. The total pass rate on the fourth grade ELA exam was 59.1% in single-group-accountable schools compared with 66.3% in schools accountable for both groups. The pass rate for White students on the fourth grade ELA exam was very similar across groups: a 73.5% pass rate in single-group-accountable schools compared with 75.2% in schools accountable for both groups. The non-White pass rate, however, was 41.3% in single-group-accountable schools compared with 54.8% in schools accountable for both groups. Non-White students performed better in schools that were accountable for both groups, compared with schools that were accountable for only White students 17 or accountable for only non-White students, whereas White students performed about the same in all groups. In other words, schools that were even somewhat "integrated" contained students (White or non-White) who performed better than schools that were segregated. This result is amplified when considering test score gaps; in schools accountable for both groups, there were smaller test score gaps between White and non-White students. There was a 32.2-point gap across single-group-accountable schools compared with a The sample included all students from schools with 10 or more students tested in English language arts and math and excluded schools in which more than 40% of the students had individualized education programs.
distribution.
20.4-point gap in schools accountable for both groups. We found similar results for fourth grade math and for both tests in middle schools (Table 5) .
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These findings indicate that more of the statewide test score gap is due to between-school differentials than to within-school differentials. To quantify the between-and within-school components, we decomposed the statewide test score gap into between and within components as follows: The sample included all students from schools with 10 or more students tested in English language arts and math and excluded schools in which more than 40% of the students had individualized education programs.
where the statewide test score gap is calculated as X -W , the statewide White student pass rate (the White-weighted White pass rate in the state), minus X -N , the statewide non-White student pass rate (the non-White-weighted non-White pass rate in the state), and N ws is the number of White students in a school and N ns is the number of non-White students in a school. The within-school portion of the equation includes X -w s -X -s as the White deviation from the school mean and X -n s -X -s as the non-White deviation from the school mean. Table 6 shows that 85% of the total statewide gap in fourth grade ELA results was attributable to between-school differences. Similar results were Stiefel et al. / So Many Children Left Behind 541 Note: The sample included all students from schools with 10 or more students tested in English language arts (ELA) and math and excluded schools in which more than 40% of the students had individualized education programs. White deviation from mean school performance was calculated as the difference between the White-weighted White pass rate and the White-weighted school pass rate. Non-White deviation from mean school performance was calculated as the difference between the non-White-weighted non-White pass rate and the non-White-weighted school pass rate. Average within-school gap was calculated as the White deviation from mean school performance minus the non-White deviation from mean school performance. Average between-school gap was calculated as the non-White-weighted school pass rate subtracted from the White-weighted school pass rate. These weighted pass rates can be interpreted as the state average pass rate if either non-White students (who are disproportionately educated in poorly performing schools) or White students were evenly distributed across the state and those redistributed students took on their new schools' averages.
distribution.
542 Educational Policy calculated for fourth grade math and eighth grade ELA and math exams, also shown in Table 6 . Thus, a much larger disparity exists between segregated schools than within mixed schools, yet only the latter schools will be held accountable for both White and non-White student performance.
What Are the Characteristics of Schools Accountable for Both Race Groups?
We used probit regression analysis to understand which characteristics of schools and districts were associated with having adequate numbers of both White and non-White students to report subgroup scores. These regressions are available on request; here, we report results. All else equal, schools that were larger; located in larger districts; located in districts with higher percentages of Hispanic and Asian or American Indian students; and in downstate suburbs, large cities, or New York City were more likely to be accountable for subgroups. Thus, the subgroup accountability will be unevenly distributed, falling on already fiscally stressed cities.
Are Districts Accountable When Schools Are Not?
An important provision of NCLB ensures that if a school has too few students in a subgroup to be held accountable for that group, the district will be held accountable, allowing for small subgroup numbers in individual schools to be aggregated to the district level. How does this provision affect accountability for small racial subgroups at the school level? When we aggregated subgroup numbers to the district level, we found that in [2001] [2002] 261 of 657 districts (39.7%) were accountable for both White and non-White fourth grade students. Table 7 shows that district-level accountability will capture 920 more elementary schools and 84,860 more students (30,040 more White students and 54,820 more non-White students) than school accountability alone. That leaves 556 schools (24.7%) that will remain unaccountable even when districts are held accountable (396 districts, or 60.3%, will not be held accountable for both White and non-White students).
At the middle school level, 257 of 635 districts (40.5%) were accountable for eighth grade White and non-White students. District-level accountability will capture 202 more middle schools and 36,868 more students (2,815 White and 34,053 non-White) than when schools alone are held accountable. That leaves 382 schools (35.8%) that will remain exempt from accountability even at the district level (378 districts, or 59.4%, will not be held accountable for both White and non-White students).
What kinds of districts are accountable for both White and non-White students? We found results very similar to our analysis at the school level.
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Large total district enrollment increases the likelihood of accountability. Rural and upstate suburban districts are less likely to be accountable, whereas districts with higher percentages of Hispanic and Asian or American Indian students are more likely to be held accountable. We found similar patterns for middle schools and across years.
Although future work will better assess the actual behavioral response to the unintended incentives set up by NCLB, to get a sense of the possible Stiefel et al. / So Many Children Left Behind 543 The sample included all students from schools with 10 or more students tested in English language arts and math and excluded schools in which more than 40% of the students had individualized education programs. White-accountable schools had test performance data for 10 or more White students tested and fewer than 10 non-White students tested. Non-Whiteaccountable schools had test performance data for fewer than 10 White students tested and 10 or more non-White students tested. The number of students is based on the availability of performance data for English language arts. Numbers would be slightly different if based on data for math.
magnitude, we calculated the number of schools that most easily could manipulate student enrollment or test taking to avoid the 10-student minimum. These schools were defined as having greater than or equal to 7 but less than or equal to 13 White or non-White students. We found that of the 2,249 elementary schools in the state (the total number of schools from Table 1 that had tested 10 or more students in both ELA and math), 374 (16.6%) were near the cutoff of 10 White or non-White students. In addition, of the 374, only 44.4% were considered to be accountable for both groups in our previous analysis; in other words, those are the schools in which we are most likely to see the behavioral response to get under the cutoff of 10 students to avoid accountability measures. In addition, of the 1,068 middle schools in the state, 119 (11.1%) were near the cutoff of 10 students. Of those 119, 48% were considered to be accountable in our previous analysis, and thus have the greatest incentive to get under the 10-student minimum to avoid accountability. These schools with the greatest incentive to get under the accountability minimums are, on average, smaller, less poor, much less likely to be in New York City, and much more likely to be in downstate suburbs than the schools in the rest of New York State.
We emphasize that these estimates are conservative, because we used a low cutoff of 10 students for racial subgroups and we defined racial subgroups broadly (White and non-White), as opposed to the five specific race groups included in the data (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and American Indian).
Conclusions
Evidence in this article points to a number of limitations in the NCLB subgroup accountability system and its ability to lower racial test score gaps in the face of segregation in New York State. First, it is clear that setting a threshold subgroup size high enough for statistically meaningful performance measures is likely to require excluding a large number of schools-and, it is important to note, districts-from accountability for their subgroups' performance levels. If the intention is to compare performance between race groups, even using highly aggregated groupings such as White and non-White students, the coverage is far from complete. Incomplete coverage reduces the reach of sanctions in the NCLB subgroup reporting reforms, distributes subgroup accountability measures unequally across schools and districts, and possibly creates incentives for schools and districts to remain below accountability thresholds by manipulating enrollment or test taking.
Second, the socioeconomic characteristics of schools held accountable for subgroups differ from those that will be exempted from such accountability. Large, urban schools that are more racially and ethnically integrated will bear a disproportionate accountability burden, whereas rural schools, and to a lesser degree upstate suburban schools, that are less integrated will be disproportionately exempted. Put differently, racial subgroup accountability may in practice affect an atypical set of schools: disproportionately urban, Hispanic or Asian, and large rather than rural or suburban, White, and small. To a large extent, these results reflect the continuing legacy of residential and school racial segregation in New York State.
Perhaps more disturbing is the possibility that the desire to avoid the pressure of subgroup accountability may serve to discourage school integration, if districts (or schools) are able to manipulate enrollment or testtaking behavior to drop below subgroup reporting thresholds designed to ensure statistically valid performance measures.
Third, the schools accountable for subgroup reporting are not the ones with the lowest test scores for non-White students: Average scores are consistently lower among the exempted schools. The NCLB subgroup accountability provision will bind most in schools and districts that are contributing less to statewide test gaps. The role of subgroup reporting in NCLB cannot be expected to eliminate racial test score disparities, because the largest disparities lie between schools without significant subgroup populations. Thus, to the extent that subgroup accountability is intended to raise test scores, the results suggest that accountability measures may be missing an important segment of the population and will, then, have a lesser impact than had been imagined.
Fourth, more complete subgroup accountability coverage can be obtained by raising accountability to the district level. Ultimately, it may be necessary to raise subgroup accountability sanctions to the state level to shine a light on the disparity in performance between subgroups of all students. Without the full weight of subgroup accountability falling across all districts and schools, the provisions of NCLB cannot be expected to achieve its goals even with more stringent AYP goals in later years.
In the end, closing racial test score gaps will have to rely more on the efficacy of the AYP provisions of NCLB than on the subgroup reporting provisions. If AYP provisions are maintained to include 100% of students and if standards of proficiency are not lowered, then as 2014 approaches, all schools, segregated or not, will be "required" to bring all students to proficiency. As a number of analysts have shown, however, the likelihood of meeting this goal is quite low (Linn, 2005) , and states may well be tempted to lower proficiency standards. Without strict adherence to AYP, however, racial gaps will not be closed through subgroup reporting.
Notes
1. In a letter to the editor of the New York Times, Rod Paige (2003) , President Bush's first secretary of education, wrote, "In the past, a lot of lip service has been given to closing the achievement gap-the law's central tenet-but now the framework is set for real reform to finally happen" (p. A20).
2. More precisely, schools receiving federal aid that fail to achieve AYP in their students' performance are, depending on the number of years of failure, listed as "in need of improvement," required to provide tutoring for students with inadequate performance, required to let students transfer to better performing schools, or required to "reconstitute" (U.S. Department of Education, 2004b).
3. An article on the Princeton, New Jersey, school district illustrates the emphasis on the subgroup reporting component of the law by the popular press (Freedman, 2005) . The article quoted the co-chair of the school district's minority education committee: "I do have some suspicions when measurements come from standardized tests alone. But if it's going to shine a bright light on the inadequacies of the system, especially as it regards children of color, then I'm all in favor" (p. B7). Over time, the AYP requirements of NCLB would impose 100% proficiency for all students and therefore apply to all schools, including racially segregated ones. However, scholars have discussed how difficult it will be achieve 100% proficiency by 2014 and how NCLB requirements may be changed by then (e.g., Linn, 2005) .
4. Although Black students constitute 17.2% of public school students enrolled in the United States, they make up 32.0% of public school enrollment in the large cities of the United States. Similar disparities exist for Hispanic students (16.3% in the United States compared with 32.0% in large cities) and Asian and Pacific Islander students (4.1% compared with 28%).
5. The notion that apparently neutral federal policies can exacerbate segregation is not new. For example, Voith and Gyourko (2002) examined the extent to which the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing leads to the decentralization of land use, such that higher income households become more separated from lower income individuals, who become isolated in central cities. Similarly, Persky and Kurban (2003) found that federal subsidies reduce the price of land outside cities, providing an incentive to those who can take advantage of the subsidies to leave cities.
6. The dissimilarity index captures the overall unevenness of a population's distribution and is used extensively in residential and school segregation literatures; this index describes the percentage of one group of individuals who would have to move to be represented in all areas equal to their population proportion. The isolation index is a type of interaction index that shows how likely an individual is to interact with individuals from his or her own group. 7. We review the literature on the effects of improving student test scores, through sanctioned methods, in response to accountability systems. For further background on school strategies that "game the system" to increase the average test scores of students by, for example, excluding potentially low-performing students from the pool of students taking highstakes tests, see Kim (2004) and Jacob (2002) . 8. The effect of subgroup size on accountability measures was pursued in earlier work by Kane and Staiger (2001) .
9. In addition, we analyzed data from the previous school year, [2000] [2001] ; the results were qualitatively the same, and therefore we report results for only the most recent year for which data were made available.
10. Forty percent was a natural division in the data, allowing us to include schools with significant, but not predominant, special education populations while removing from the analysis schools that require separate, focused studies of their specific goals, operations, student and teacher populations, and instructional practices.
11. Grade size correlates very highly with school size in New York State. 12. The category non-White includes four of the five racial subgroups reported by the NYSED, including Hispanic, Black, Asian, and American Indian (White is the omitted group).
13. The same trends can be seen in the results from the previous year, 2000-2001. The major difference across years was the large increase in eighth grade math scores. Student pass rates increased by more than 8 points overall from 2000-2001 to 2001-2002 . This increase was due to increases in all subgroups, including all disaggregated race groups: White pass rates increased by nearly 10 points; non-White pass rates increased by 7 points, as did Black and Hispanic pass rates; and Asian and American Indian pass rates increased by 8 points. These same increases were not seen in the eighth grade ELA exam results or in the fourth grade ELA and math exam results. Because all subgroups saw relatively large increases in eighth grade math pass rates, the size of the test score gap between White and non-White students did not change much over years.
14. In principle, the threshold should be high enough that the statistics are precisely measured but not so high that few schools will meet the threshold. Exact sizes are left up to states, however, and there is recent evidence that these sizes vary greatly for subgroups of disabled students, leading to wide state variation in numbers of schools failing to meet NCLB standards because of subgroup performance (Olson, 2005) .
15. Note that New York State's approved accountability plan with the U.S. Department of Education shows that the state is still considering subgroup sizes between 20 and 40 (New York State Education Department, 2004; U.S. Department of Education, 2004a). Because the final minimum has yet to be determined and made public, and to be conservative, we chose the average of these two proposed cutoffs-30 across three grades, or 10 students per gradewhich also reflects some of the most conservative minimums proposed by other state accountability plans. The lowest minimum (i.e., the outlier) subgroup size proposed for holding a school accountable is 5 in Maryland (with a 95% confidence interval). The next lowest minimums are 10 per grade in Louisiana, South Dakota, and Utah (with a 99% confidence interval); 11 in New Hampshire (with a 95% confidence interval); and 20 in New Jersey (with a 95% confidence interval) (see Olson, 2003) .
16. The dissimilarity index can be interpreted as the proportion of Group A (e.g., nonWhite students) that would have to transfer from one school in which they are overrepresented to one in which they are underrepresented to achieve a distribution in each school proportional to their statewide percentage representation. The dissimilarity index is calculated according to the following formula:
where D is the dissimilarity index, N Ai is the number of students from Group A (non-White students, in this case) in the ith school, and N Bi is the number of students from Group B (White
